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Geostrategic Net Assessment

INDOPACOM through 2030
Nathan P. Freier and John H. Schaus
ABSTRACT: INDOPACOM transformation faces two risks:
the same kind of strategic distraction that derailed prior efforts
to refocus on the Indo-Pacific and competing Joint and service
concepts and priorities. Mitigating these risks and restoring a
hypercompetitive US position in INDOPACOM relies on US
senior leaders’ adopting bold change. The Army can lead the way
by adopting four transformational roles in INDOPACOM—
grid, enabler, multidomain warfighter, and capability and capacity
generator.

C

hina’s advantages in anti-access/area-denial will require novel
US warfighting solutions going forward.1 A more credible,
hypercompetitive United States IndoPacific Command
(INDOPACOM) Joint Force will inevitably rely on the deliberate and
innovative combination of service strengths. The Army’s substantial
Joint enabling capability in mission command, protection, sustainment,
movement, and intelligence (and information) make it an attractive
foundation upon which to build a more agile, distributed, and lethal
theater-level Joint Force approach.2

Distraction

For nearly 20 years, the US military focused to a fault on irregular
wars with nonstate actors in Afghanistan, Iraq, and more broadly the
Global War on Terror. During that time, the Department of Defense
prioritized counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and nation building
in its strategy, concepts, plans, and readiness. The post-9/11 wars were
perhaps the most disruptive for the US Army. The Army shouldered the
wars’ principal burdens.3 Army forces grew accustomed to predictable
mission sets and deployment cycles in familiar regions, and US soldiers
became expert irregular warfighters. This all occurred, however, as
profound change in the competitive environment emerged on the other
side of the world.
As the United States fought insurgents and terrorists, China
developed hypercompetitive approaches focused on outflanking US
1. Kathy Gilsinan, “How the U.S. Could Lose a War with China,” Atlantic, July 25, 2019, https://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/07/china-us-war/594793/.
2. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Operations, Army Doctrine Publication
(ADP) 3-0 (Washington DC: HQDA, 2016), 10, https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files
/misc/doctrine/CDG/cdg_resources/manuals/adp/ADP_3-0.pdf; and Philip Davidson, “China’s
Challenge to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (speech, Harvard Kennedy School, Cambridge, MA,
October 1, 2019), https://www.belfercenter.org/.
3. Brendan W. McGarry and Emily M. Morgenstern, Overseas Contingency Operations Funding:
Background and Status, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Rept. No. 116-R44519 (Washington,
DC: CRS, September 6, 2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44519.pdf.
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interests and, if necessary, defeating US forces in the Indo-Pacific
region. To date, China’s hypercompetitive methods have confounded
traditional US approaches to competition, deterrence, and warfighting.4
As a result, the US military and the Army specifically are out of position
conceptually, physically, and with deployed and anticipated capabilities
in this highly contested region.

The Transformation Imperative

The 2018 National Defense Strateg y (NDS 18) recognizes an imperative
for wholesale Joint transformation to meet the challenge of great power
rivalry.5 United States INDOPACOM is a centerpiece in that anticipated
transformation. Among the services, the Army may have the toughest
challenge meeting essential transformational objectives.
The Army recently adopted the concept of multidomain operations
as its contribution to great power rivalry.6 Consistent with its self-image
as the nation’s war winner, its conception of multidomain operations
frequently culminates in large-scale, multidomain ground combat.
However, the multidomain and multifunctional demands on the
Army in the Indo-Pacific will likely call for a different employment
of Army forces. While multidomain ground combat may provide the
platform for success in a future European or Middle Eastern war,
INDOPACOM’s unique geography and threat profile do not bend as
easily to Army preferences.

China, China, China!

While the military was away in the Middle East, a fundamental
threat to American power emerged in the Indo-Pacific region.7
The strategic landscape there changed dramatically from the time
of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review to NDS 18.8 Over that time,
US political, economic, and military advantage eroded. China emerged
as a hypercompetitive regional juggernaut, and its explosive economic
growth—combined with strategic vision—enabled rapid expansion
of its diplomatic and economic influence, financial interests, military

4. Nathan Freier et al, “Game On or Game Over: Hypercompetition and Military
Advantage,” War Room, May 22, 2018, https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles
/the-new-defense-normal-nine-fundamentals-of-hypercompetition/.
5. James Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America:
Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: Department of Defense (DoD),
2018), 2–3, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=807329.
6. US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), The U.S. Army Concept for MultiDomain Combined Arms Operations at Echelons Above Brigade 2025–45: Versatile, Agile, and Lethal, Version
1.0 (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, September 2018), https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files
/documents/ArmyEABConcept.pdf.
7. Paul McCleary, “Acting SecDef Shanahan’s First Message: ‘China, China,
China’,” Breaking Defense, January 2, 2019, https://breakingdefense.com/2019/01
/acting-secdef-shanahans-first-message-china-china-china/.
8. See Henry Shelton, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, DoD, September 30, 2001), https://archive.defense.gov/pubs/qdr2001.pdf; and
Mattis, National Defense Strategy.
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transformation, and gray-zone activism.9 Now all of these factors
combine to position China as the most significant rival to American
power, influence, and freedom of action since the Cold War.
The method, scope, and pace of China’s approach to countering the
United States and the essential character of an American response is most
accurately described as hypercompetition.10 China’s growing influence,
reach, and raw potential means hypercompetitive military rivalry will
be most acute for the United States in the INDOPACOM theater well
through the next decade. Hypercompetition, the persistent struggle for
transient advantage across highly contested domains and competitive
spaces, is a business concept adapted by US Army War College
researchers to describe contemporary great power rivalry.11 It presumes
fortune favors the bold in an environment where no defense-relevant
advantage is permanent. Instead, hypercompetition is acknowledgement
that the persistent pursuit and exploitation of new or regained advantage
will characterize future great power rivalry and conflict.
US adaptation to hypercompetitive great power rivalry started late
and has only recently begun to take root. Most notably over the past
three years, the 2017 National Security Strateg y and NDS 18 offered clear
guidance that the United States should prioritize great power rivalry
in strategy, plans, acquisition, and employment of military capabilities
and methods. A byproduct of the two Trump administration strategies
is official identification of China as the United States’ pacing military
threat.12 Ongoing efforts to refocus the Department of Defense and
its Joint military forces on an aggressive hypercompetitive China are as
appropriate as they are overdue.

Identifying the Problem

The commander of INDOPACOM succinctly described a key
aspect of change in the Indo-Pacific military dynamic during a 2019
Senate Armed Services Committee hearing: “we speak frequently about
the erosion of our advantage . . . which is really the case here. China has

9. See Ashley J. Tellis, “Protecting American Primacy in the Indo-Pacific: Testimony:
Senate Armed Services Committee, April 25th, 2017,” Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace,
n.d.,
https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/04/25/protecting-american-primacy-in
-indo-pacific-pub-68754; Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), China Military Power: Modernizing
a Force to Fight and Win, DIA-02-1706-085 (Washington, DC: DIA, 2019), 2–6, https://www.
dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/China_Military
_Power_FINAL_5MB_20190103.pdf; and James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “Five Shades of
Chinese Gray Zone Strategy,” National Interest, May 2, 2017, https://nationalinterest.org/feature
/five-shades-chinese-gray-zone-strategy-20450.
10. See Freier et al., “Game Over”; and Freier, John Schaus, and William Braun, “Prologue,” in
An Army Transformed: INDOPACOM Hypercompetition and U.S. Army Theater Design, ed. Freier, John
Schaus, and William Braun (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, forthcoming).
11. Richard A. D’Aveni and Robert Gunther, Hypercompetition: Managing the Dynamics of Strategic
Maneuvering (New York: Free Press, 1994).
12. Department of Defense Budget Posture: Hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 116th
Cong. (March 14, 2019) (statement of acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan), https://www
.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Shanahan_03-14-19.pdf.
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seriously eroded that quantitative advantage—the number of assets that
they have—but they’re also eroding that qualitative advantage.”13
Aggregate military capability, however, is only one measure of
relative advantage or disadvantage. If, consistent with NDS 18, the United
States intends to reverse the erosion of military advantage and restore
a favorable military balance in an increasingly volatile INDOPACOM
theater, it needs to address key vulnerabilities in its current Joint Force
theater design across more than aggregate or measurable military assets.
A comprehensive view of theater design includes strategy and operational
concepts; forces and capabilities; footprint and presence; authorities,
permissions, and agreements; and mission command arrangements.
In this more comprehensive view, the United States is dangerously
out of position conceptually and physically, and as a result also out of
position with regard to deployed forces and capabilities for long-term
hypercompetition with China. This reality exacerbates the theater-wide
erosion of advantage. It limits military options available to Joint Force
commanders. It also simplifies the decision-making calculus of Chinese
political and military leadership.

Out of Position Conceptually
NDS 18 and institutional Army strategy both note the importance
of developing and experimenting with innovative operating concepts.14
Though there is some progress, INDOPACOM and its assigned service
components are not yet on a common Joint path that transfers greater risk
to China and imposes costs while lowering US and partner risks.15 China,
on the other hand, pursues its regional interests at US expense through
sweeping military transformation and effective gray-zone campaigning.16
Absent effective US counteraction—starting with a coherent and unified
Joint military approach—China’s aggressive military transformation
and its deliberate gray-zone maneuvering will progressively increase
US risk and limit realistic future US military options.

13. Posture of United States Indo-Pacific Command and United States Forces Korea: Hearing before
the Senate Armed Services Committee, 116th Cong. (February 12, 2019) (statements of Admiral
Philip S. Davidson and General Robert B. Abrams), https://www.armed-services.senate.gov
/hearings/19-02-12-united-states-indo-pacific-command-and-united-states-forces-korea.
14. Mattis, National Defense Strategy, 7; and Mark Esper and Mark A. Milley, The Army Strategy
(Washington, DC: HQDA, October 25, 2018), 8, https://www.army.mil/e2/downloads/rv7
/the_army_strategy_2018.pdf.
15. Phillip S. Davidson, “Transforming the Joint Force: A Warfighting Concept for
Great Power Competition,” (speech, WEST 2020, San Diego, California, March 3, 2020),
https://www.pacom.mil/Media/Speeches-Testimony/Article/2101115/transfor ming
-the-joint-force-a-warfighting-concept-for-great-power-competition/.
16. See Michael J. Green et al., Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025: Capabilities, Presence, and Partnerships:
An Independent Review of U.S. Defense Strategy in the Asia-Pacific (Lanham, MD: Center for Strategic
and International Studies, January 2016), 15–19, http://csis.org/files/publication/160119
_Green_AsiaPacificRebalance2025_Web_0.pdf; and Kathleen H. Hicks and Joseph P. Frederici,
“Campaigning through China’s Gray Zone Tactics,” in The Struggle for Power: U.S.-China Relations
in the 21st Century, ed. Leah Bitounis and Jonathon Price (Washington, DC: The Aspen Institute,
2020), 96–104, https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/2020/01/TheStruggleForPower
.pdf ?_ga=2.184197153.682513604.1579885138-406713349.1579619482.
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At present there are two Joint warfighting concepts under
development by separate US headquarters or staffs and at least six
independent service-specific operational concepts in various stages of
development. Army multidomain operations is among them. While
all these efforts are potentially value-added, the effect of multiple
uncoordinated and, at times, competing concept development efforts
threatens Joint unity of effort. Further, without strong senior-leader
oversight, new Joint concepts are vulnerable to suboptimal compromise
favoring service interests over emerging Joint operational requirements.

Out of Position Physically
The regional posture of the United States is concentrated in northeast
Asia, predicated on discredited assumptions of military advantage and
positioned for the efficient prosecution of a second Korean war. It is
not a forward posture conducive to effective hypercompetition or—
in extremis—transition to conflict with a hostile China. Substantial
advances in the number and quality of China’s precision-guided
munitions—delivered from land, air, and sea—by themselves may
nullify the deterrent effect of an American military heavily concentrated
on large bases in Japan, Korea, Guam, and the Hawaiian Islands.
Likewise in the event of increased tensions or conflict, China enjoys
strategic depth, internal or heavily protected lines of communication,
and the ability to employ and maneuver critical assets with the benefit
of relative sanctuary. But US and partner forces positioned in theater
are within reach of China’s substantial precision weapons inventory and
would be in immediate danger. Furthermore, US and allied surge and
sustainment forces pushed from the United States and other regions
would be under persistent threat as they attempted to reinforce forwarddeployed forces.17 En route to a conflict in the Indo-Pacific theater,
US and allied forces would have to navigate long, vulnerable lines of
communication at the end of which entry into and maneuver within the
theater would be heavily contested.

Out of Position in Capabilities
US Joint Forces currently lack the capability for the kind of largescale, widely distributed “all-domain” operations essential to give China
pause in escalating regional tensions or to defeat the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) in armed hostilities.18 In particular, power projection
and access, Joint command and control (including secure data and
communications), sustainment, protection, and intratheater movement
and maneuver are challenged by the tyrannies of antiquated posture,
distance, and an increasingly capable PLA.
For the Army specifically, delivery of lethal and nonlethal
multidomain effects and ground combat are favored at the expense of
17. See Mattis, National Defense Strategy.
18. See Davidson, “Transforming the Joint Force”; and Ernest Nisperos, “Joint All Domain
Effects Convergence: Evolving C2 Teams,” Over the Horizon, March 10, 2020, https://othjournal
.com/2020/03/10/joint-all-domain-effects-convergence-evolving-c2-teams/.
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Joint-enabling capabilities essential to an agile and distributed theater
Joint Force.19 According to one observer, the US military is figuring out
how to “shoot” without solving how it “moves” and “communicates.”20
Our research suggests adding protect and sustain to the deficits in
movement and communication as well.

From Strategy to Hypercompetition

The operational demand for more distributed Joint operations
within the INDOPACOM area of operations will expose the folly of
a suboptimized Joint approach, uncoordinated service concepts, and
persistent neglect of the enabling functions upon which successful Joint
operations rely. Continued disadvantages in concepts, physical posture,
and capabilities will increasingly constrain or deny the ability of US Joint
Forces to hypercompete, especially when confronted with escalation
from China.
A new hypercompetitive theater approach that is biased for action
is the most appropriate way ahead. This approach implies transforming
theater design across Joint functions and service components while
actively hypercompeting for and exploiting transient advantages. US Joint
Forces should pursue longer-lead, high-risk, high-reward technological
advancements. They cannot, however, necessarily rely on them for
decisive effect over the near- to midterm. Across the Joint Force, the
earliest wins will likely emerge not from breakthrough technological
change but from innovative and novel operational concepts, task
organization, mission tailoring, and physical posture.
Consistent with NDS 18, a transformed INDOPACOM theater
design should prioritize change to regain the strategic initiative. With
initiative, the Joint Force can expand the competitive space to complicate
rival decision-making and restore and maintain the favorable military
balance.21 A favorable military balance does not connote restoration of
permanent military advantage. Rather it implies the persistent ability to
generate and exploit opportunity faster and with greater impact than can
the pacing rival China.
Initiative, nurtured by deliberate choices in the application of
resources and effort, allows the Joint Force to identify and exploit
hypercompetitive opportunities as they emerge. This initiative starts in
the persistent campaigning that should inevitably occur in the gray space
short of armed conflict. As the Department of Defense works to develop
and consolidate around a new Joint warfighting concept, an essential
component of persistent campaigning is refocusing and repurposing
Joint and service-level priorities to maximize operational and theaterstrategic impact. We suggest the Army is central to such a change.

19. See Esper and Milley, Army Strategy, 1, 2, 6–8.
20. Telephone conversation with a senior military officer responsible for service concept
development in January 2020.
21. Mattis, National Defense Strategy, 4.
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Joint Transformation

Real Joint transformation in INDOPACOM can come when
one service embraces the job of enabling Joint multi- or all-domain
operations. This transformation is the Army’s greatest value proposition
in the INDOPACOM theater over the next decade as it relates to the
US-China rivalry. Toward this end, the Army can contribute most
effectively to a transformed Joint theater design by adopting four
transformational roles:
•• the Army as the grid
•• the Army as the enabler
•• the Army as the multidomain warfighter
•• the Army as the capability and capacity generator 22
The Army as the grid sees an Army-led establishment of a distributed,
resilient, and mutually reinforcing theater network of expeditionary
clusters, hubs, and nodes as the foundation for Joint multidomain
operations. The core purpose of the grid is to expand the competitive
space, creating options for Joint Force commanders, ultimately, enabling
effective Joint multidomain maneuver.
The Army as the enabler calls for a Joint-focused Army
transformation specific to INDOPACOM in mission command,
sustainment, protection, movement, and intelligence (and information)
to animate the grid. This transformation requires a persistent small-unit,
multifunctional Army presence prepared to activate clusters, hubs, and
nodes to meet Joint operational demands. It further requires missiontailored Army forces to task organize and operate in distributed fashion
well below the brigade level.
The Army as the multidomain warfighter sees the Army-led fielding
of a land-based, multidomain warfighting capability with theaterwide presence and reach in concert with sister services and foreign
partners. Army and sister service multidomain capabilities and concepts
should be inspired by and integrated into a unified Joint multidomain
theater concept.
The Army as the capability and capacity generator leverages a
significant asymmetric US advantage—a strong network of regional
allies and partners—to enhance traditional ground-force competencies
and expand complementary multidomain capability. In this regard, Army
forces—within a unified Joint concept—can be a catalyst for fielding a
combined land-based, multidomain warfighting network that draws on
the unique strengths and competencies of US partners.
The Army is currently focused on its roles of multidomain warfighter
and capability and capacity generator in INDOPACOM.23 The roles of
22. Freier et al., An Army Transformed.
23. Ryan McCarthy, “The Army’s Strategy in the Indo-Pacific,” (remarks, Brookings Institution,
Washington, DC, January 10, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/01
/fp_20200110_army_indopacific_transcript.pdf.
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grid and enabler will be more difficult to adopt and socialize—though
they are likely most important for the Army and the Joint Force in longterm hypercompetition with China. Only the Army can underwrite
effective Joint Force operations theater-wide operating at the scale
needed across the expanse of the Indo-Pacific region in the functions of
mission command, protection, sustainment, movement, and intelligence
(and information).

Conclusion

Thriving in hypercompetition first requires the United States to
recognize and commit to engaging in it. A hypercompetitive US approach
to INDOPACOM requires agile, disruptive, and mutually reinforcing
Joint and Service theater designs. This point is not lost on China, but
it remains conspicuously underdeveloped in US strategic calculations.
The Army is currently well positioned to take the first steps in inspiring
essential Joint transformation by creating a flexible, scalable, and dynamic
theater design biased first for distributed Joint theater enabling. This
bias also implies commitment to establishing the physical grid essential
to the enabling function. The grid and enabling functions combined will
require innovative reconfiguration and employment of Army mission
command, protection, sustainment, movement, and intelligence (and
information) capabilities. As it becomes a reality, transformed Army
theater design should help signal enduring US commitment to the
region, expand options available to Joint Force commanders, and help
them complicate rival planning and decision-making.
Success cannot be the result of good fortune or providence in
INDOPACOM.24 Rather it must rely on transformational change in Joint
and combined warfighting and the service concepts supporting them.
The window of opportunity to make bold transformational change will
not be open long and will be difficult to negotiate.
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